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glg娱乐官网登录_汇丰报告:中国负债率稳定 制造业并非"去杠杆化"目标

glg娱乐官网登录_汇丰报告:中国负债率稳定 制造业并非

glg娱乐官网登录,汇丰报告:中国负债率稳定 制造业并非北京“去杠杆化”运动的目

The gap between growth in Total Social Financing (TSF) and nominal GDP has already narrowed to a ten-year low….…the next step is to keep total credit growth stable, while shifting from off-balance to on-balance sheet lendingAll this helps to support the corporate sector’s technology centric investment

社会融资总额(TSF)与名义GDP之间的差距已经缩小到十年来的最低点......。...下一步是保持信贷总增长稳定从表外贷款转移到表内贷款所有这些都有助于支持企业界的技术中心投资

China’s widening gap between growth in debt and nominal GDP (the so-called “credit gap”) has long been a key concern for many investors. Yet this gap has been narrowing quickly since late 2016 thanks to Beijing’s financial deleveraging polices and stronger nominal GDP growth. In Q1 2018, the credit gap narrowed further to a ten-year low of 0.3ppt, well below the post-global financial crisis (GFC) average of 6.9ppt. We expect this gap to stay below-trend in the coming years.

长期以来,中国债务增长与名义GDP之间的差距(所谓的“信贷缺口”)一直是许多投资者关注的重点。 但由于北京的金融去杠杆政策和更高的名义GDP增长,自2016年年底以来,这一差距迅速缩小。 2018年第一季度,信贷差距进一步缩小至十年低点0.3个百分点,远低于全球金融危机后的平均6.9个百分点。 我们预计未来几年这一差距将维持在低于趋势水平。

What’s next? We believe Beijing will focus on keeping total credit growth stable, while shifting away from off-balance sheet to on-balance sheet lending. In fact, a breakdown of TSF suggests this is already happening. But so far, the slowdown in off-balance lending is not being compensated by a corresponding increase in onbalance sheet lending. As a result, overall borrowing conditions have been

tightening. But we believe the situation is likely to change soon, especially given that the Politburo’s most recent quarterly economic work meeting emphasised striking a balance between structural reforms and boosting domestic demand. We are likely to see more explicit policy guidance to encourage on-balance sheet lending, in order to support the corporate sector’s technology upgrading. Policies, such as reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cuts, should help to increase loanable funds and lower banks’ cost of funding, in this context.

下一步是什么? 我们认为,北京方面将重点放在保持信贷总量稳定增长的同时,将表外贷款从表外转移到资产负债表外贷款。 事实上,一个TSF的细分表明这已经发生。 但迄今为止,美国经济放缓资产负债表外借贷的相应增加不能补偿表外贷款。 因此,整体借款条件一直存在收紧。 但我们认为这种情况很可能很快发生变化,特别是鉴于政治局最近一次季度经济工作会议强调在结构改革与扩大内需之间取得平衡。 为了支持企业部门的技术升级,我们可能会看到更明确的政策指导以鼓励表内贷款。 在此背景下,诸如存款准备金率(RRR)削减等政策将有助于增加可贷资金和降低银行的资金成本。

We argued earlier that private manufacturing firms are not the target of Beijing’s

‘deleveraging’ policy, and that this sector has already started a new cycle of technology upgrading (see Why deleveraging won’t derail industrial upgrading, 16 April; China’s private sector revs up, 18 July 2017). More policies to encourage on-balance sheet bank lending should support the manufacturing sector’s technological upgrading and innovation. Combined with the implementation of the announced tax incentives for equipment purchasing and R&D, this will likely sustain the expansion in the private corporate sector’s technology-centric investment in the coming years. Sustained growth in private business investment would not only help offset a slowdown in infrastructure investment in the near term, but also lift productivity growth and hence lower the credit intensity of GDP growth in the medium term.

我们早些时候辩称,私营制造企业不是北京“去杠杆化”政策的目标,该行业已经开始了一个新的技术升级周期(请参阅去杠杆化不会影响产业升级的原因,4月16日;中国的私营部门在2017年7月18日复苏)。 鼓励表内银行贷款的更多政策应该支持制造业的技术升级和创新。 结合实施已宣布的设备采购和研发税收激励措施,这将有可能在未来几年支持私营企业部门以技术为中心的投资。 私人企业投资的持续增长不仅有助于抵消近期基础设施投资放缓,而且还会提高生产率增长,从而在中期内降低GDP增长的信贷强度。

A better equilibrium…更好的平衡...

Accelerating credit growth, at a time of slowing GDP growth, has been a major concern amongst investors over the past few years. This has contributed to a widening credit gap, measured as the difference between the debt to GDP ratio and its long-run average.

Yet thanks to the rebound in nominal GDP growth and a slew of ‘supply-side reforms’ aimed at restructuring heavy industries and deleveraging the financial system, the so-called credit gap has narrowed to a ten-year low. On the one hand, nominal GDP growth has rebounded from a 16-year low of 6.4% at end-2015 to 11.3% in 2017. This is thanks to the recovery in the manufacturing sector, and also the reflation momentum generated by the policies to cut overcapacity in heavy industries. Nominal GDP growth eased to 10.2% in Q1 2018, but we expect it

to remain in the double digits in 2018. On the other hand, the growth of TSF, a broad metric for credit growth, slowed to a 12-year low of 10.5% in March 2018. This reflects the ongoing tightening of financial regulations, which helped to reduce leverage in the financial system. As a result of both better demand growth and supply rationalisation, the gap between nominal GDP growth and credit growth has narrowed to a post-GFC low of 0.3ppt.

The better balance of economic growth and credit growth has helped to stabilise the debt to

GDP trajectory, and helped to reduce the credit gap. In Chart 2, we show the BIS measure of the credit gap. The data is only available to Q3 2017, but even so had already shown a meaningful halving of the measured credit gap from close to 30ppt in Q2 2016 to 16.7ppt by Q3 2017.

In Chart 3, we illustrate how this could evolve over the next two years. If the Chinese economy could maintain its nominal GDP growth at or close to the double-digit range, and credit grows by 2-3ppt faster than nominal GDP growth, then the overall debt to GDP ratio could continue to rise by a modest 2ppt or so annually. But it would be at trend, or even slightly below trend, rate (depending on trend line estimation), hence implying a stable or even slightly shrinking credit gap.

As we have argued in an earlier report, Beijing has come to a more nuanced view of ‘deleveraging’ over the past years. It aims to first stabilise the debt to GDP ratio, before gradually reducing it. In order to achieve this balance, policy makers should continue to maintain a balance between GDP and credit growth. This implies, on the one hand, stable macro-economic policies (such as monetary, fiscal policies) and policies to encourage new growth drivers (such as ‘new’ manufacturing sectors’) and, on the other hand, structural reform policies such as fiscal consolidation and financial regulations to instil fiscal discipline and contain credit growth.

正如我们在早些时候的报告中所指出的那样,北京在过去几年中对“去杠杆化”的看法更加微妙。 它的目的是首先稳定债务与GDP比率,然后逐渐减少。 为了实现这种平衡,决策者应该继续保持GDP与信贷增长之间的平衡。 这意味着,一方面,稳定的宏观经济政策(如货币政策,财政政策)和政策鼓励新的增长动力(如“新”制造业部门),另一方面则是结构性改革政策,如财政整顿和金融监管来灌输财政纪律和遏制信贷增长。

…through more on-balance sheet lending......通过更多表内借贷

And while maintaining a stable pace of broad credit growth, policy makers could do more to change the composition of credit creation, from off-balance sheet to on-balance sheet lending.

In response to more stringent conduct regulation, and in anticipation of the more comprehensive joint-proposal to regulate Wealth Management Products (WMP), credit creation in the ‘shadow bank’ has already slowed. In Chart 4, we show the decomposition of TSF, a broad measure of credit growth. Growth of the non-loan component, essentially consisting of trust products, entrusted products and bonds (though a large part of the bond market is not part of the ‘shadow’ system) has declined to a 12-year low of 6.3% y-o-y from 13.3% y-o-y at end-2016. Meanwhile,

formal bank lending growth has been more or less stable at 12-13% y-o-y. The TSF decomposition is a relatively easy way of illustrating the divergence between ‘on-’ and ‘offbalance’ sheet credit growth. There are other ways to do so, for example, by comparing loan growth with a more bottom-up estimate of sum of trust products etc. The takeaway, however, is similar. Credit is shifting from the ‘off-balance sheet’ channel back onto the balance sheet.

Conclusion  结论

China’s credit gap, which has been a source of concern for many investors over the past few years, has narrowed to a post-GFC low over the past 18 months. This has come on the back of a meaningful narrowing of nominal GDP growth and credit growth. Manufacturing sector reflation, as well as supply-side reforms (such as tighter financial and local government financing policies), both played a role. We estimate that even if GDP growth can be sustained at around a double-digit rate, the debt to GDP trajectory will likely stay in line with the historical trend, implying a more or less constant credit gap over the coming years.

中国的信贷缺口在过去几年中一直是许多投资者关注的焦点,过去18个月以来,中国的信贷缺口已经缩小到后GFC低点。 这是由于名义国内生产总值增长和信贷增长的意义收窄所致。 制造业的再融资以及供给侧的改革(如更严格的金融和地方政府融资政策)都起到了作用。 我们估计,即使国内生产总值的增长率能够保持在两位数左右的水平,债务与GDP的轨迹也可能与历史趋势保持一致,这意味着未来几年信贷缺口或多或少会保持不变。

After having achieved this equilibrium, we think Beijing’s next policy step is to shift the offbalance sheet liability back onto the balance sheet. This implies a structural shift in debt, rather than an outright reduction. Decomposition of TSF, a broad measure of credit, suggests that this is already happening. But so far, the slowdown in off-balance sheet liability is not being fully compensated by a corresponding pickup in on-balance sheet lending. We believe this situation could change, and there could be more explicit policy encouragement for banks to increase their on-balance sheet lending growth, when more financial regulations especially on bankoriginated WMP become enforced.

达到这一平衡后,我们认为北京的下一步政策措施是将失衡负债表责任转回到资产负债表上。 这意味着债务的结构性转变,而不是彻底的减少。 TSF的分解,广泛的信用度表明,这已经发生。 但到目前为止,表外负债的放缓还没有通过表内贷款的相应回升而得到全面补偿。 我们认为这种情况可能会发生变化,并且可能会有更明确的政策鼓励让银行增加资产负债表贷款的增长,因为更多的财务条例尤其是银行融资的WMP得到执行。

We wrote in an earlier piece that the manufacturing sector is not the target of Beijing’s ‘deleveraging’ campaign. We argued that the sector should emerge relatively unscathed, supported by the cyclical recovery in capacity utilisation rate, profit and low leverage, as well as structural factors such as China’s rising educational attainment (see Why de-leveraging won’t derail industrial upgrading, 16 April). But a more nuanced ‘deleveraging’ policy and more Chart 6. Loan demand is picking up Chart 7. Average lending rate is higher policies to support on-balance sheet lending could also work in the manufacturing sector’s favour. Thanks to the cyclical recovery, loan demand is picking up. Additional fiscal incentives, announced at the NPC this year, should also help to generate demand for capex-related spending. Meanwhile, a more effective regulatory environment should prod banks to lend more to the manufacturing sector, which is seeing a rebound in corporate profit and positive policy tailwind. A recovery in the manufacturing sector would not only help to anchor growth in the near term, but also support productivity growth and reduce credit intensity of GDP growth in the years to come.

我们在较早的一篇文章中写道,制造业并非北京“去杠杆化”运动的目标。我们认为,由于产能利用率,利润和低杠杆的周期性复苏以及中国教育程度不断提高等结构性因素的支持,该行业应该相对安然无恙。(请参阅为什么去杠杆化不会影响产业升级,16四月)。但更细微的“去杠杆化”政策和更多图表6.贷款需求正在回升图7:平均贷款利率是支持资产负债表贷款的较高政策也可能对制造业有利。由于周期性复苏,贷款需求正在回升。今年在全国人大会议上宣布的额外财政激励措施也应有助于产生对资本支出相关支出的需求。与此同时,更有效的监管环境应促使银行向制造业提供更多贷款,制造业企业盈利反弹,政策利好。制造业的复苏不仅有助于短期内的增长,而且还将支持生产率增长,并减少未来几年GDP增长的信贷强度。

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